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Abstract
An important question when eliciting opinions
from experts is how to aggregate the reported opin-
ions. In this paper, we propose a pooling method
to aggregate expert opinions. Intuitively, it works
as if the experts were continuously updating their
opinions in order to accommodate the expertise of
others. Each updated opinion takes the form of a
linear opinion pool, where the weight that an ex-
pert assigns to a peer’s opinion is inversely related
to the distance between their opinions. In other
words, experts are assumed to prefer opinions that
are close to their own opinions. We prove that such
an updating process leads to consensus, i.e., the ex-
perts all converge towards the same opinion. Fur-
ther, we show that if rational experts are rewarded
using the quadratic scoring rule, then the assump-
tion that they prefer opinions that are close to their
own opinions follows naturally. We empirically
demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed method
using real-world data.
1 Introduction
Predicting outcomes of relevant uncertain events plays an es-
sential role in decision-making processes. For example, com-
panies rely on predictions about consumer demand and ma-
terial supply to make their production plans, while weather
forecasts provide guidelines for long range or seasonal agri-
cultural planning, e.g., farmers can select crops that are best
suited to the anticipated climatic conditions.
Forecasting techniques can be roughly divided into statis-
tical and non-statistical methods. Statistical methods require
historical data that contain valuable information about the fu-
ture event. When such data are not available, a widely used
non-statistical method is to request opinions from experts re-
garding the future event [Cooke, 1991]. Opinions usually
take the form of either numerical point estimates or prob-
ability distributions over plausible outcomes. We focus on
opinions as probability mass functions.
The literature related to expert opinions is typi-
cally concerned about how expert opinions are used
[Mosleh et al., 1988], how uncertainty is or should be repre-
sented [Ng and Abramson, 1990], how experts do or should
reason with uncertainty [Cooke, 1991], how to score the
quality and usefulness of expert opinions [Savage, 1971;
Boutilier, 2012], and how to produce a single consensual
opinion when different experts report differing opinions
[DeGroot, 1974]. It is this last question that we address in
this paper.
We propose a pooling method to aggregate expert opinions
that works as if the experts were continuously updating their
opinions in order to accommodate the expertise and knowl-
edge of others. Each updated opinion takes the form of a
linear opinion pool, or a convex combination of opinions,
where the weight that an expert assigns to a peer’s opinion
is inversely related to the distance between their opinions. In
other words, experts are assumed to prefer opinions that are
close to their own opinions. We prove that such an updat-
ing process leads to consensus, i.e., the experts all converge
towards the same opinion. We also show that if the opinions
of rational experts are scored using the quadratic scoring rule,
then the assumption that experts prefer opinions that are close
to their own follows naturally.
2 Related Work
The aggregation of expert opinions have been extensively
studied in computer science and, in particular, artificial intel-
ligence, e.g., the aggregation of opinions represented as pref-
erences over a set of alternatives as in social choice theory
[Chevaleyre et al., 2007], the aggregation of point estimates
using non-standard opinion pools [Jurca and Faltings, 2008],
and the aggregation of probabilistic opinions using prediction
markets [Chen and Pennock, 2010].
A traditional way of aggregating probabilistic opinions
is through opinion pooling methods. These methods are
often divided into behavioral and mathematical methods
[Clemen and Winkler, 1999]. Behavioral aggregation meth-
ods attempt to generate agreement among the experts through
interactions in order for them to share and exchange knowl-
edge. Ideally, such sharing of information leads to a consen-
sus. However, these methods typically provide no conditions
under which the experts can be expected to reach agreement
or even for terminating the iterative process.
On the other hand, mathematical aggregation methods con-
sist of processes or analytical models that operate on the in-
dividual probability distributions in order to produce a single,
aggregate probability distribution. An important mathemati-
cal method is the linear opinion pool, which involves taking
a weighted linear average of the opinions [Cooke, 1991].
Several interpretations have been offered for the weights
in the linear opinion pool. The performance-based approach
recommends setting the weights based on previous perfor-
mance of the experts [Genest and McConway, 1990]. A
caveat with this approach is that performance measurements
typically depend on the true outcome of the underlying event,
which might not be available at the time when the opinions
have to be aggregated. Also, previous successful (respective-
ly, unsuccessful) predictions are not necessarily good indica-
tors of future successful (respectively, unsuccessful) ones.
More closely related to this work is the interpretation of
weights as a measure of distance. For example, Barlow et
al. [1986] proposed that the weight assigned to each expert’s
opinion should be inversely proportional to its distance to the
most distant opinion, where distance is measured according
to the Kullback-Leibler divergence. A clear drawback with
this approach is that it only considers the distance to the most
distant opinion when assigning a weight to an expert’s opin-
ion. Thus, even if the majority of experts have similar and
accurate opinions, the weights of these experts’ opinions in
the aggregate prediction can be greatly reduced due to a sin-
gle distant opinion.
For a comprehensive review of different perspectives on
the weights in the linear opinion pool, we refer the interested
reader to the work by Genest and McConway [1990].
3 Model
We consider the forecasting setting where a decision maker
is interested in a probability vector over a set of mutually
exclusive outcomes θ1, . . . , θz , for z ≥ 2. The decision
maker deems it inappropriate to interject his own judgment
about these outcomes. Hence, he elicits probabilistic opin-
ions from n experts. Experts’ opinions are represented by
z-dimensional probability vectors f1, . . . , fn. The probabil-
ity vector fi = (fi,1, . . . , fi,z) represents expert i’s opinion,
where fi,k is his subjective probability regarding the occur-
rence of outcome θk.
Since experts are not always in agreement, belief aggrega-
tion methods are used to combine their opinions into a single
probability vector. Formally, f = T (f1, . . . , fn), where f is
called an opinion pool, and the function T is the pooling op-
erator. The linear opinion pool is a standard approach that
involves taking a weighted linear average of the opinions:
T (f1, . . . , fn) =
n∑
i=1
wifi (1)
where wi denotes the weight associated with expert i’s opin-
ion. We make the standard assumption that 0 ≤ wi ≤ 1, for
every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and
∑n
i=1 wi = 1.
3.1 Consensus and Weights
DeGroot [1974] proposed a model which describes how a
group can reach agreement on a common probability distri-
bution by pooling their individual opinions. Initially, each
expert i is informed of the opinion of every other expert. In
order to accommodate the information and expertise of the
rest of the group, expert i updates his own opinion as follows:
f
(1)
i =
n∑
j=1
pi,jfj
where pi,j is the weight that expert i assigns to the opinion
of expert j when he carries out this update. Weights must be
chosen on the basis of the relative importance that experts as-
sign to their peers’ opinions. It is assumed that pi,j > 0, for
every expert i and j, and
∑n
j=1 pi,j = 1. In this way, each
updated opinion takes the form of a linear opinion pool. The
whole updating process can be written in a slightly more gen-
eral form using matrix notation, i.e., F(1) = PF(0), where:
P =


p1,1 p1,2 · · · p1,n
p2,1 p2,2 · · · p2,n
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
pn,1 pn,2 · · · pn,n

 , and
F
(0) =


f1
f2
.
.
.
fn

 =


f1,1 f1,2 · · · f1,z
f2,1 f2,2 · · · f2,z
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
fn,1 fn,2 · · · fn,z


Since all the opinions have changed, the experts might wish
to revise their new opinions in the same way as they did
before. If there is no basis for the experts to change their
weights, we can then represent the whole updating process
after t revisions, for t ≥ 1, as follows:
F
(t) = PF(t−1) = PtF(0) (2)
Let f (t)i =
(
f
(t)
i,1 , . . . , f
(t)
i,z
)
be expert i’s opinion after t
updates, i.e., it denotes the ith row of the matrix F(t). We
say that a consensus is reached if f (t)i = f
(t)
j , for every expert
i and j, as t → ∞. Since P, the matrix with weights, is a
n×n stochastic matrix, it can then be regarded as the one-step
transition probability matrix of a Markov chain with n states
and stationary probabilities. Consequently, one can apply a
limit theorem that says that a consensus is reached when there
exists a positive integer t such that every element in at least
one column of the matrix Pt is positive [DeGroot, 1974].
3.2 Weights as a Measure of Distance
The original method proposed by DeGroot [1974] has some
drawbacks. First, the experts might want to change the
weights that they assign to their peers’ opinions after learn-
ing their initial opinions or after observing how much the
opinions have changed from stage to stage. Further, opin-
ions and/or identities have to be disclosed to the whole group
when the experts are assigning the weights. Hence, privacy
is not preserved, a fact which might be troublesome when the
underlying event is of a sensitive nature.
In order to tackle these problems, we derive the weights
that experts assign to the reported opinions by interpreting
each weight as a measure of distance between two opinions.
We start by making the assumption that experts prefer opin-
ions that are close to their own opinions, where closeness is
measured by the following distance function:
D(fi, fj) =
√∑z
k=1(fi,k − fj,k)
2
z
(3)
i.e., it is the root-mean-square deviation between two opin-
ions fi and fj . Given the above assumption, one can estimate
the weight that expert i assigns to expert j’s opinion at a given
time t, for t ≥ 1, as follows:
p
(t)
i,j =
α
(t)
i
ǫ+D
(
f
(t−1)
i , f
(t−1)
j
) (4)
where α(t)i normalizes the weights so that they sum to one,
and ǫ is a small, positive constant used to avoid division by
zero. We set f (0)i = fi, i.e., it is the original opinion reported
by expert i. There are some important points regarding equa-
tion (4). First, the distance between two opinions is always
non-negative. Hence, the constant ǫ ensures that every single
weight is strictly greater than 0 and strictly less than 1. Fur-
ther, the closer the opinions f (t−1)i and f
(t−1)
j are, the higher
the resulting weight p(t)i,j will be. Since D
(
f
(t−1)
i , f
(t−1)
i
)
=
0, the weight that each expert assigns to his own opinion is
always greater than or equal to the weights that he assigns to
his peers’ opinions.
Now, we can redefine equation (2) so as to allow the experts
to update their weights based on the most recent opinions. Af-
ter t revisions, for t ≥ 1, we have that F(t) = P(t)F(t−1) =
P
(t)
P
(t−1) . . .P(1)F(0), where each element of each matrix
P
(k) is computed according to equation (4):
P
(k) =


p
(k)
1,1 p
(k)
1,2 · · · p
(k)
1,n
p
(k)
2,1 p
(k)
2,2 · · · p
(k)
2,n
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
p
(k)
n,1 p
(k)
n,2 · · · p
(k)
n,n


The opinion of each expert i at time t then becomes f (t)i =∑n
j=1 p
(t)
i,j f
(t−1)
j . Algorithm 1 provides an algorithmic de-
scription of the proposed method.
In order to prove that all opinions converge towards a con-
sensual opinion when using the proposed method, consider
the following functions:
δ (U) =
1
2
max
i,j
z∑
k=1
|ui,k − uj,k|
γ(U) = min
i,j
z∑
k=1
min(ui,k, uj,k)
where 0 ≤ δ (U) , γ(U) ≤ 1, and U is a stochastic matrix.
δ (U) computes the maximum absolute difference between
two rows of a stochastic matrix U. Thus, when δ
(
F
(t)
)
= 0,
all rows of F(t) are the same, i.e., a consensus is reached. We
use the following results in our proof [Paz, 1971]:
Algorithm 1 Algorithmic description of the proposed method
to find a consensual opinion.
Require: n probability vectors f (0)1 , . . . , f
(0)
n .
Require: recalibration factor ǫ.
1: for t = 1 to ∞ do
2: for i = 1 to n do
3: for j = 1 to n do
4: p(t)i,j =
α
(t)
i
ǫ+D
(
f
(t−1)
i
,f
(t−1)
j
)
5: end for
6: f (t)i =
∑n
j=1 p
(t)
i,j f
(t−1)
j
7: end for
8: end for
Proposition 1. Given two stochastic matrices U and V,
δ(UV) ≤ δ(U)δ(V).
Proposition 2. Given a stochastic matrix U, then δ(U) =
1− γ(U).
Our main result is stated below.
Theorem 1. When t→∞, f (t)i = f
(t)
j , for every expert i and
j.
Proof. Recall that F(t) is the stochastic matrix repre-
senting the experts’ opinions after t revisions, and that
F
(t) = P(t)F(t−1). Now, consider the following sequence:(
δ
(
F
(0)
)
, δ
(
F
(1)
)
, ..., δ
(
F
(t)
))
. We are interested in the
behavior of this sequence when t → ∞. First, we show that
such a sequence is monotonically decreasing:
δ
(
F
(t)
)
= δ
(
P
(t)
F
(t−1)
)
≤ δ
(
P
(t)
)
δ
(
F
(t−1)
)
=
(
1− γ
(
P
(t)
))
δ
(
F
(t−1)
)
≤ δ
(
F
(t−1)
)
The second and third lines follow, respectively, from
Propositions 1 and 2. Since δ (U) ≥ 0 for every stochastic
matrix U, then the above mentioned sequence is a bounded
decreasing sequence. Hence, we can apply the standard
monotone convergence theorem [Bartle and Sherbert, 2000]
and δ
(
F
(∞)
)
= 0. Consequently, all rows of the stochastic
matrix F(∞) are the same.
In other words, a consensus is always reached under the
proposed method, and this does not depend on the initial re-
ported opinions. A straightforward corollary of Theorem 1 is
that all revised weights converge to the same value.
Corollary 1. When t→ ∞, p(t)i,j = 1n , for every expert i and
j.
Hence, the proposed method works as if experts were
continuously exchanging information so that their individual
knowledge becomes group knowledge and all opinions are
equally weighted. Since we derive weights from the reported
opinions, we are then able to avoid some problems that might
arise when eliciting these weights directly, e.g., opinions do
not need to be disclosed to others in order for them to assign
weights, thus preserving privacy.
The resulting consensual opinion can be represented as
an instance of the linear opinion pool. Recall that f (t)i =∑n
j=1 p
(t)
i,j f
(t−1)
j =
∑n
j=1 p
(t)
i,j
∑n
k=1 p
(t−1)
j,k f
(t−2)
k = · · · =∑n
j=1 βjf
(0)
j , where β = (β1, β2, . . . , βn) is a probability
vector that incorporates all the previous weights. Hence, an-
other interpretation of the proposed method is that experts
reach a consensus regarding the weights in equation (1).
3.3 Numerical Example
A numerical example may clarify the mechanics of the pro-
posed method. Consider three experts (n = 3) with the fol-
lowing opinions: f1 = (0.9, 0.1), f2 = (0.05, 0.95), and
f3 = (0.2, 0.8). According to (3), the initial distance be-
tween, say, f1 and f2 is:
D(f1, f2) =
√
(0.9− 0.05)2 + (0.1− 0.95)2
2
= 0.85
Similarly, we have that D(f1, f1) = 0 and D(f1, f3) = 0.7.
Using equation (4), we can then derive the weights that each
expert assigns to the reported opinions. Focusing on expert
1 at time t = 1 and setting ǫ = 0.01, we obtain p(1)1,1 =
α
(1)
1 /0.01, p
(1)
1,2 = α
(1)
1 /0.86, and p
(1)
1,3 = α
(1)
1 /0.71. Since
these weights must sum to one, we have α(1)1 ≈ 0.00975 and,
consequently, p(1)1,1 ≈ 0.975, p
(1)
1,2 ≈ 0.011, and p
(1)
1,3 ≈ 0.014.
Repeating the same procedure for all experts, we obtain the
matrix:
P
(1) =
[
0.975 0.011 0.014
0.011 0.931 0.058
0.013 0.058 0.929
]
The updated opinion of expert 1 is then f (1)1 =∑3
j=1 p
(1)
1,jfj ≈ (0.8809, 0.1191). By repeating the above
procedure, when t → ∞, P(t) converges to a matrix where
all the elements are equal to 1/3. Moreover, all experts’ opin-
ions converge to the prediction (0.3175, 0.6825). An inter-
esting point to note is that the resulting prediction would be
(0.3833, 0.6167) if we had taken the average of the reported
opinions, i.e., expert 1, who has a very different opinion,
would have more influence on the aggregate prediction.
4 Consensus and Proper Scoring Rules
The major assumption of the proposed method is that experts
prefer opinions that are close to their own opinions. In this
section, we formally investigate the validity of this assump-
tion. We start by noting that in the absence of a well-chosen
incentive structure, the experts might indulge in game playing
which distorts their reported opinions. For example, experts
who have a reputation to protect might tend to produce fore-
casts near the most likely group consensus, whereas experts
who have a reputation to build might tend to overstate the
probabilities of outcomes they feel will be understated in a
possible consensus [Friedman, 1983].
Scoring rules are traditional devices used to promote hon-
esty in forecasting settings [Savage, 1971]. Formally, a scor-
ing rule is a real-valued function, R(fi, e), that provides a
score for the opinion fi upon observing the outcome θe.
Given that experts’ utility functions are linear with respect
to the range of the score used in conjunction with the scor-
ing rule, the condition that R is strictly proper implies
that the opinion reported by each expert strictly maximizes
his expected utility if and only if he is honest. Formally,
argmax
f ′
i
Efi [R(f
′
i)] = fi, where Efi [R(·)] is the fi-expected
value of R, Efi [R(f ′i)] =
∑z
e=1 fi,eR(f
′
i , e). A well-known
strictly proper scoring rule is the quadratic scoring rule:
R(fi, e) = 2fi,e −
z∑
k=1
f2i,k (5)
The proof that the quadratic scoring rule is indeed strictly
proper as well as some of its interesting properties can be
seen in the work by Selten [1998].
Proper scoring rules have been used as a tool to promote
truthfulness in a variety of domains, e.g., when sharing
rewards among a set of agents based on peer evaluations
[Carvalho and Larson, 2010; Carvalho and Larson, 2011;
Carvalho and Larson, 2012], to incentivize agents to ac-
curately estimate their own efforts to accomplish a task
[Bacon et al., 2012], in prediction markets [Hanson, 2003],
in weather forecasting [Gneiting and Raftery, 2007], etc.
4.1 Effective Scoring Rules
Scoring rules can also be classified based on monotonicity
properties. Consider a metric G that assigns to any pair of
opinions fi and fj a real number, which in turn can be seen as
the shortest distance between fi and fj . We say that a scoring
rule R is effective with respect to G if the following relation
holds for any opinions fi, fj , and fk [Friedman, 1983]:
G(fi, fj) < G(fi, fk) ⇐⇒ Efi [R(fj)] > Efi [R(fk)]
In words, each expert’s expected score can be seen as a mono-
tone decreasing function of the distance between his true
opinion and the reported one, i.e., experts still strictly max-
imize their expected scores by telling the truth, and the closer
a reported opinion is to the true opinion, the higher the ex-
pected score will be. The property of effectiveness is stronger
than strict properness, and it has been proposed as a desider-
atum for scoring rules for reasons of monotonicity in keeping
an expert close to his true opinion [Friedman, 1983].
By definition, a metric G must satisfy the following condi-
tions for any opinions fi, fj , and fk:
1. Positivity: G(fi, fj) ≥ 0, for all experts i, j, and
G(fi, fj) = 0 if and only if fi = fj ;
2. Symmetry: G(fi, fj) = G(fj , fi);
3. Triangle Inequality: G(fi, fk) ≤ G(fi, fj) +G(fj , fk).
The root-mean-square deviation shown in (3) satisfies the
above conditions. However, equation (4), taken as a func-
tion of opinions, is not a true metric, e.g., symmetry does
not always hold. We adjust the original definition of effec-
tive scoring rules so as to consider weights instead of metrics.
We say that a scoring rule R is effective with respect to a set
of weights W = {p(t)1,1, . . . , p
(t)
1,n, p
(t)
2,1, . . . , p
(t)
n,n} assigned at
any time t ≥ 1 if the following relation holds for any opinions
f
(t−1)
i , f
(t−1)
j , and f
(t−1)
k :
p
(t)
i,j < p
(t)
i,k ⇐⇒ Ef (t−1)
i
[R(f
(t−1)
k )] > Ef (t−1)
i
[R(f
(t−1)
j )]
In words, each expert’s expected score can be seen as a
monotone increasing function of his assigned weights, i.e.,
the higher the weight one expert assigns to a peer’s opinion,
the greater the expected score of that expert would be if he
reported his peer’s opinion, and vice versa. We prove below
that the quadratic scoring rule shown in (5) is effective with
respect to a set of weights assigned according to (4).
Proposition 3. The quadratic scoring rule shown in (5)
is effective with respect to a set of weights W =
{p
(t)
1,1, . . . , p
(t)
1,n, p
(t)
2,1, . . . , p
(t)
n,n} assigned at any time t ≥ 1
according to equation (4).
Proof. Given an opinion fj , we note that the fi-expected
value of the quadratic scoring rule in (5) can be written as:
Efi [R(fj)] =
z∑
e=1
fi,eR(fj , e)
=
z∑
e=1
(
2fj,efi,e − fi,e
z∑
x=1
f2j,x
)
=
z∑
e=1
2fj,efi,e −
z∑
e=1
fi,e
z∑
x=1
f2j,x
=
z∑
e=1
2fj,efi,e −
z∑
x=1
f2j,x
Now, consider the weights assigned by expert i to the opin-
ions of experts j and k at time t ≥ 1 according to equation
(4). We have that p(t)i,j < p(t)i,k if and only if:
α
(t)
i
ǫ+D
(
f
(t−1)
i , f
(t−1)
j
) < α(t)i
ǫ+D
(
f
(t−1)
i , f
(t−1)
k
) ≡
D
(
f
(t−1)
i , f
(t−1)
k
)
< D
(
f
(t−1)
i , f
(t−1)
j
)
≡
z∑
x=1
(
f
(t−1)
i,x − f
(t−1)
k,x
)2
<
z∑
x=1
(
f
(t−1)
i,x − f
(t−1)
j,x
)2
≡
z∑
x=1
2f
(t−1)
i,x f
(t−1)
k,x −
z∑
y=1
(
f
(t−1)
k,y
)2
>
z∑
x=1
2f
(t−1)
i,x f
(t−1)
j,x −
z∑
y=1
(
f
(t−1)
j,y
)2
≡
E
f
(t−1)
i
[
R
(
f
(t−1)
k
)]
> E
f
(t−1)
i
[
R
(
f
(t−1)
j
)]
Proposition 3 implies that there is a correspondence be-
tween weights, assigned according to (4), and expected scores
from the quadratic scoring rule: the higher the weight one ex-
pert assigns to a peer’s opinion, the greater that expert’s ex-
pected score would be if he reported his peer’s opinion, and
vice versa. Hence, whenever experts are rational, i.e., when
they behave so as to maximize their expected scores, and their
opinions are rewarded using the quadratic scoring rule, then
the major assumption of the proposed method for finding a
consensual opinion, namely that experts prefer opinions that
are close to their own opinions, is formally valid. A straight-
forward corollary of Proposition 3 is that a positive affine
transformation of the quadratic scoring rule is still effective
with respect to a set of weights assigned according to (4).
Corollary 2. A positive affine transformation of the
quadratic scoring rule R in (5), i.e., xR (fi, e) + y, for x > 0
and y ∈ ℜ, is effective with respect to a set of weights
W = {p
(t)
1,1, . . . , p
(t)
1,n, p
(t)
2,1, . . . , p
(t)
n,n} assigned at any time
t ≥ 1 according to equation (4).
5 Empirical Evaluation
In this section, we describe an experiment designed to test
the efficacy of the proposed method for finding a consensual
opinion. In the following subsections, we describe the dataset
used in our experiments, the metrics used to compare differ-
ent methods to aggregate opinions, and the obtained results.
5.1 Dataset
Our dataset was composed by 267 games (256 regular-season
games and 11 playoff games) from the National Football
League (NFL) held between September 8th, 2005 and Febru-
ary 5th, 2006. We obtained the opinions of 519 experts for
the NFL games from the ProbabilityFootball1 contest. The
contest was free to enter. Each expert was asked to report his
subjective probability that a team would win a game. Pre-
dictions had to be reported by noon on the day of the game.
Since the probability of a tie in NFL games is very low (less
than 1%), experts did not report the probability of such an
outcome. In particular, no ties occurred in our dataset.
Not all 519 registered experts reported their predictions for
every game. An expert who did not enter a prediction for a
game was removed from the opinion pool for that game. On
average, each game attracted approximately 432 experts, the
standard deviation being equal to 26.37. The minimum and
maximum number of experts were, respectively, 243 and 462.
Importantly, the contest rewarded the performance of experts
via a positive affine transformation of the quadratic scoring
rule, i.e., 100 − 400 × p2l , where pl was the probability that
an expert assigned to the eventual losing team.
A positive affine transformation of a strictly proper scor-
ing rule is still strictly proper [Gneiting and Raftery, 2007].
The above scoring rule can be obtained by multiplying (5) by
200 and subtracting the result by 100. The resulting proper
scoring rule rewards bold predictions more when they are
right. Likewise, it penalizes bold predictions more when they
are wrong. For example, a prediction of 99% earns 99.96
1Available at http://probabilityfootball.com/2005/
points if the chosen team wins, and it loses 292.04 points if
the chosen team loses. On the other hand, a prediction of
51% earns 3.96 points if it is correct, and it loses 4.04 points
if it is wrong. A prediction of 50% neither gains nor loses
any points. The experts with highest accumulated scores won
prizes in the contest. The suggested strategy at the contest
website was “to make picks for each game that match, as
closely as possible, the probabilities that each team will win”.
We argue that this dataset is very suitable for our purposes
due to many reasons. First, the popularity of NFL games pro-
vides natural incentives for people to participate in the Proba-
bilityFootball contest. Furthermore, the intense media cover-
age and scrutiny of the strengths and weaknesses of the teams
and individual players provide useful information for the gen-
eral public. Hence, participants of the contest can be viewed
as knowledgeable regarding to the forecasting goal. Finally,
the fact that experts were rewarded via a positive affine trans-
formation of the quadratic scoring rule fits perfectly into the
theory developed in this work (see Corollary 2).
5.2 Metrics
We used two different metrics to assess the prediction power
of different aggregation methods.
Overall Accuracy
We say that a team is the predicted favorite for winning a
game when an aggregate prediction that this team will win
the game is greater than 0.5. Overall accuracy is then the per-
centage of games that predicted favorites have indeed won. A
polling method with higher overall accuracy is more accurate.
Absolute Error
Absolute error is the difference between a perfect prediction
(1 for the winning team) and the actual prediction. Thus, it is
just the probability assigned to the losing team (pl). An ag-
gregate prediction with lower absolute error is more accurate.
5.3 Experimental Results
For each game in our dataset, we aggregated the reported
opinions using three different linear opinion pools: the
method proposed in Section 3, henceforth referred to as the
consensual method, with ǫ = 10−4; the traditional average
approach, where all the weights in (1) are equal to 1/n; and
the method proposed by Barlow et al. [1986], henceforth re-
ferred to as the BMS method. These authors proposed that the
weight assigned to expert i’s opinion should bewi = cI(fi,fi∗ ) ,
where c is a normalizing constant, I(fi, fi∗) is the Kullback-
Leibler divergence, and fi∗ achieves max{I(fi, fj) : 1 ≤ j ≤
n}, i.e., fi∗ is the most distant opinion from expert i’s opin-
ion. The BMS method produces indeterminate outputs when-
ever there are probability assessments equal to 0 or 1. Hence,
we recalibrated the reported opinions when using the BMS
method by replacing 0 and 1 by, respectively, 0.01 and 0.99.
Given the aggregated opinions, we calculated the perfor-
mance of each method according to the accuracy metrics pre-
viously described. Regarding the overall accuracy of each
method, the consensual method achieves the best perfor-
mance in this experiment with an overall accuracy of 69.29%.
The BMS and average methods achieve an overall accuracy
of, respectively, 68.54% and 67.42%.
Table 1: Average absolute error of each method over the 267
games. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
Consensual Average BMS
0.4115 (0.1813) 0.4176 (0.1684) 0.4295 (0.1438)
Table 1 shows the average absolute error of each method
over the 267 games. The consensual method achieves the
best performance with an average absolute error of 0.4115.
We performed left-tailed Wilcoxon signed-rank tests in order
to investigate the statistical relevance of these results. The
resulting p-values are all extremely small
(
< 10−4
)
, showing
that the results are indeed statistically significant.
Despite displaying a decent overall accuracy, the BMS
method has the worst performance according to the absolute
error metric. A clear drawback with this method is that it
only considers the distance to the most distant opinion when
assigning a weight to an opinion. Since our experimental de-
sign involves hundreds of experts, it is reasonable to expect at
least one of them to have a very different and wrong opinion.
The high number of experts should give an advantage to the
average method since biases of individual judgment can off-
set with each other when opinions are diverse, thus making
the aggregate prediction more accurate. However, the aver-
age method achieves the worst overall accuracy, and it per-
forms statistically worse than the consensual method when
measured under the absolute error metric. We believe this re-
sult happens because the average method ends up overweight-
ing extreme opinions when equally weighting all opinions.
On the other hand, under the consensual method, experts
put less weight on opinions far from their own opinions,
which implies that this method is generally less influenced
by extreme predictions as illustrated in Section 3.3.
6 Conclusion
We proposed a pooling method to aggregate expert opin-
ions. Intuitively, the proposed method works as if the experts
were continuously updating their opinions, where each up-
dated opinion takes the form of a linear opinion pool, and the
weight that each expert assigns to a peer’s opinion is inversely
related to the distance between their opinions. We proved that
this updating process leads to a consensus.
A different interpretation of the proposed method is that
experts reach a consensus regarding the weights of a linear
opinion pool. We showed that if rational experts are rewarded
using the quadratic scoring rule, then our major assumption,
namely that experts prefer opinions that are close to their own
opinions, follows naturally. To the best of our knowledge, this
is the first work linking the theory of proper scoring rules to
the seminal consensus theory proposed by DeGroot [1974].
Using real-world data, we compared the performance of
the proposed method with two other methods: the tradi-
tional average approach and another distance-based aggrega-
tion method proposed by Barlow et al. [1986]. The results of
our experiment show that the proposed method outperforms
all the other methods when measured in terms of both overall
accuracy and absolute error.
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